Introduction
In the build up to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) debates about the nature and extent of (EU) Europe became widespread. Questions as to whether the 2004 enlargement would be the last major expansion of the EU were hotly debated, and the different candidate countries made great efforts to ensure they did not miss the departing boat toward membership. Within the EU, concerns about the enlargement focused on issues such as the need to avoid any dilution of the significant gains of the European project, as well as fears that the EU's expansion to 25 members would turn the Union into a bureaucratic dinosaur and further undermine its democratic legitimacy. In this context, a desire to draw the final borders of (EU) Europe has become pronounced, with the perceived threat being that unchecked expansion will not only make the Union unworkable, but may actually pose an existential threat to it. Although it is clear that much disagreement exists on where the final borders of (EU) Europe should be drawn (e.g., should Turkey be in or out), the belief that Europe's finalité should soon be decided has become widely held.
Importantly, the issue of borders is also linked to questions of security. Central here is the fact that the EU has explicitly used the promise of future membership in order to promote stability along its borders. Drawing 'final' borders therefore poses the EU with a dilemma of how it will promote stability and security in its neighbouring regions if the carrot of enlargement is no longer available. The EU's current answer to these issues of where to draw the final borders of the Union and how to 2 The European Neighbourhood Policy and Why the Northern Dimension Matters
Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi 1 promote security and stability beyond those borders has been presented in its developing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU's optimism that this policy framework can achieve these goals is evident in the policy's proclaimed ambition that the neighbouring countriesonce they come to reflect the EU's own set of values -will constitute a benevolent and stable 'ring of friends '. 2 In this context, this chapter addresses three issues. First, it challenges the view that the ENP will, as a projection of an 'ideal' EU, solve the Union's security concerns regarding its external borders. In this respect, despite proclamations to the contrary, we argue that the ENP fails to extricate the EU from a logic that links external security with the need for further integration of outsiders. One reason for this is the fact that the ENP remains premised on the mechanism of conditionality. Another, however, is that the ENP remains infused with discourses of threat. Thus, although the ENP talks of building bridges to the EU's new 'ring of friends', the discursive logic of the ENP rather emphasizes these 'friends' as a potential security problem for the EU and mandates dealing with these 'friends' on a less than equal basis. Therefore, whether the 'ring of friends' will characterize the relationship with the EU as one of friendship (rather than as colonial, for example) is questionable.
Second, the chapter further highlights these points by comparing the ENP with the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) and by arguing that the generalization of the ENP to the North and the NDI's consequent subordination to the ENP are undermining key developments in the North. Thus, although various statements within the ENP proclaim that the more dialogue-based and less value-oriented NDI should be seen as a model for the ENP, with the ENP integrating its most positive elements, the actual relationship between the two policies is quite problematic. Indeed, we argue that the idea that aspects of the NDI can be included in the ENP fundamentally misunderstands that the NDI and ENP operate according to very different logics when it comes to thinking about the nature of political space, borders and subjectivity.
